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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RAYMOND CHARLES MARQUEZ,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20060737-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2006), possession
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 76-10-503(2)(b) (West 2004), and possession of paraphernalia, a class B

misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004). This Court has
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not challenging the weapons
frisk of defendant's person where Trooper Vasquez saw two large knives—a
switchblade and double-bladed combat knife—in plain view inside defendant's
vehicle during the traffic stop?

"When a question of trial counsel ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on
appeal and the review is confined to the trial court record, the question of ineffectiveness
of counsel is a matter of law, to be reviewed for correctness." State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d
550, 554 (Utah App. 1993). "[DJefendant bears the burden of assuring the record is
adequate" to review his claim of ineffectiveness. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 16,
12P.3d92.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree
felony, and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. Rl.
Conviction. Defendant was convicted as charged. R52-53, R96:82, 104.
Sentence. The trial court sentenced defendant to zero to five years on each of the
two felony counts and six months on the misdemeanor count, all to run concurrently with
each other and with a sentence in another case. R55-56.
Timely appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R64.

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
During a traffic stop, Trooper Vasquez saw two large knives—a switchblade and a
double-bladed combat knife—in plain view inside defendant's vehicle. A weapons frisk
of defendant's person and vehicle additionally yielded drugs and paraphernalia.
* * *

At about 10:14 p.m. on 14 July 2006, Trooper Vasquez pulled defendant over for
having a broken tail light. R96:43-44. Trooper Vasquez walked up to defendant's
window to ask for defendant's license and registration. Id. at 44-45. When defendant
rolled his window down, Trooper Vasquez saw a switchblade on the passenger seat. Id.
at 45. When defendant leaned over to retrieve his registration and insurance inforaiation,
Trooper Vasquez noticed another metal object "tucked underneath [defendant's] right
thigh"; "it appeared to be some kind of knife." R96:45-46. Trooper Vasquez asked
defendant to exit the car "to separate [defendant] from the weapons . . . for [Trooper
Vasquez's] safety." Id. at 46.
Defendant got out of his car with his wallet still in his hand. Id. Trooper Vasquez
had defendant put his wallet on the trunk of the car rather than back in his pocket, where
he could potentially reach a weapon. Id. Trooper Vasquez then frisked defendant for
other weapons. Id. at 46-47. He felt a "hard metal object" which was "consistent with a

]

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 2, 12 P.3d 92.
3

metal pipe, . . . commonly used to smoke marijuana," in defendant's right front pocket.
Id. at 47-48. Trooper Vasquez asked defendant what the metal object was; defendant said
it was a pipe. Id. at 48. Trooper Vasquez then asked "[a] pipe to smoke what?" Id. at 48.
Such pipes could be used to smoke tobacco. Id. at 57. Defendant replied that his pipe
was for smoking "weed," or marijuana, and that he had used it that afternoon. Id. at 48,
50. Trooper Vasquez continued to frisk defendant for weapons. Id. at 48. He then
handcuffed defendant, and gave him & Miranda warning.2 Id. at 48-49, 50-51. Trooper
Vasquez then pulled the marijuana pipe from defendant's pocket. Id. at 48. The pipe
contained residue consistent with burnt marijuana. Id. at 48-50.
Trooper Vasquez placed defendant in the back seat of his patrol car and searched
defendant's car. Id. at 49. He found a black bag with a glass pipe in the glove
compartment. Id. The glass pipe had white burn marks on it consistent with
methamphetamine. Id. Trooper Vasquez also searched defendant's wallet, finding a pack
of rolling papers commonly used for marijuana, as well as "two small baggies with a
white crystal substance," or methamphetamine. Id. at 49, 74. Defendant admitted that the
residue on the pipe would test positive for methamphetamine. Id. at 50-51. Trooper
Vasquez then retrieved the knives: a "large switchblade" and "some kind of a combat
knife" with "two large blades." Id. at 50-51.

2

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the
weapons frisk fails as a matter of law because defendant asserts that the record is
inadequate to determine the propriety of the trial court's admissibility ruling. As
appellant, defendant carries the burden of assuring that the record is adequate to support
his claim of ineffectiveness. Where, as defendant here asserts, the record is inadequate,
this Court has no choice but to presume that trial counsel acted effectively.
In any event, contrary to defendant's assertion, the record is more than adequate to
determine that any challenge to the weapons frisk would have been futile. This is because
Trooper Vasquez observed two large knives—a switchblade and a double-bladed combat
knife—inside defendant's vehicle during the traffic stop. After seeing these knives, any
objectively reasonable person would have suspected that defendant may be armed and
dangerous. Case and statutory law authorize a weapons frisk of a suspect's person and
vehicle under these circumstances.
Finally, defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly failing to
review the videotape of the traffic stop prior to trial is a rehashing of his unsuccessful
motion to remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because the Court
denied defendant's rule 23B motion, the record on appeal remains devoid of nonspeculative evidence that trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly not examining the
videotape of the traffic stop. Absent any evidence that the videotape was

5

exculpatory—which defendant acknowledges is unlikely—and that trial counsel did not
examine it, this Court must presume that trial counsel acted effectively.
ARGUMENT
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE IN NOT CHALLENGING THE WEAPONS FRISK
WHERE TROOPER VASQUEZ SAW TWO LARGE KNIVES—A
SWITCHBLADE AND A DOUBLE-BLADED COMBAT KNIFE—IN
PLAIN VIEW INSIDE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE DURING THE
TRAFFIC STOP
In Point I of his brief, defendant asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel because he did not challenge the weapons frisk that yielded, among
other things, defendant's incriminating admission that he used the metal pipe found on his
person to smoke "weed." Aplt. Br. at 4 ('The warrantless 'weapons' search of
[defendant] was improper because Trooper Vasquez did not reasonably suspect that
[defendant] was armed or presently dangerous" (underlining omitted)); see also id. at 7
("[Defendant's pre-Miranda confession that he possessed marijuana par[a]phernalia was
a result of the illegal frisk and should be suppressed" (underlining omitted)). In so doing,
defendant asserts that the "record is inadequate to fully determine whether suppression
[was] appropriate." Aplt. Br. at 7. Nevertheless, defendant maintains that "the record
does adequately demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective." Id. Defendant's
conflicting characterizations of the record undercut his claim of ineffectiveness. In any
event, contrary to defendant's assertion, the record is adequate to determine that the
weapons frisk was justified and, therefore, that any motion to suppress the fruits thereof

would have been futile. This Court may reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel on either of these two grounds.
A.

Defendant's assertion that the "record is inadequate to
fully determine whether suppression [was] appropriate,"
defeats his claim of ineffectiveness.

As noted above, defendant asserts that the record is "inadequate to fully determine
whether suppression is appropriate." Aplt. Br. at 7. In so asserting, defendant necessarily
acknowledges that he cannot rebut the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered
effective assistance. His claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should therefore be
rejected.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel defendant must establish that (1)
trial counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced
his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To satisfy the first prong
of the Strickland test, defendant must demonstrate that counsel's "representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To do so,
defendant must "rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000
UT 76, TJ19, 12 P.3d 92 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In other words,
defendant must demonstrate "that there was a Tack of any conceivable tactical basis' for
counsel's actions." State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting
State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1992)). Defendant must identify

7

counsel's specific acts or omissions that "fall outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 532 (Utah App. 1997) (citations
omitted and internal quotation marks omitted). "'Proof of ineffective assistance of
counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.5" State v.
Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d
870, 877 (Utah 1993)).
To meet his burden under the second, prejudice prong of the Strickland test,
defendant must show that he was actually harmed by any alleged deficiencies. To meet
this criterion, defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but
for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694; State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993). The Supreme Court
has defined a reasonable probability as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Based on the above, before defendant may be granted relief on his claim that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the weapons frisk he must do more than
simply assert that the weapons frisk may have been illegal. See Aplt. Br. at 7 ("The
record is inadequate to fully determine whether suppression is appropriate"). He must
show that the frisk was illegal, andihsX he was prejudiced by the admission of the
evidence obtained thereby. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. But defendant merely
asserts that the record is inadequate to determine whether suppression, rather than

8

admission, of the evidence was appropriate. Aplt. Br. at 7. This assertion necessarily
undermines defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Litherland, 2000
UT 76, \ 17. When, as defendant asserts, the record is "inadequate in any fashion,
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a
finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. As recognized in Litherland, "[t]his
presumption is consistent with the fundamental policies dictated by Strickland, and with
the general rule that record inadequacies result in an assumption of regularity on appeal.
Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the instant record must be construed in favor of a
finding that counsel performed effectively.
B.

Contrary to defendant's claim, the record is adequate to
demonstrate that any motion to suppress the fruits of the
weapons frisk would have been futile.

In any event, contrary to defendant's claims, the record is adequate to demonstrate
that any challenge to the weapons frisk would have been futile. Defendant's claim of
ineffectiveness therefore lacks merit and may be rejected on this additional ground.
Although defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging
the weapons frisk, he acknowledges that Trooper Vasquez saw two knives inside his
vehicle during the traffic stop, and further acknowledges that this "fact tend[ed] to justify
[Trooper] Vasquez's [weapons] frisk." Aplt. Br. at 6. Defendant is correct. As will be
shown below, the weapons frisk was justified because after seeing large switchblade and
double-bladed combat knives in plain view inside defendant's vehicle, any objectively

9

reasonable person would have suspected that defendant was armed and dangerous.
Accordingly, any challenge to the weapons frisk would have been futile and trial
counsel's failure to do so cannot, therefore, serve as the basis for any claim of ineffective
assistance.3
Both statutory and case law make clear that an officer may conduct a weapons
frisk of an individual if the officer reasonably believes that he or anyone else is in danger.
See State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, Tf 14, 78 P.3d 590 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

3

It is not entirely clear from defendant's brief if he is challenging any evidence
other than his incriminating statement that he used the metal pipe found on his person to
smoke "weed." See Aplt. Br. at 4-7. At trial, defendant moved to suppress this statement
as having been obtained in violation of Miranda. R96:5. The prosecutor objected that
the motion was untimely and the trial court agreed, but also ruled in the alternative, that
defendant's statement was not the product of interrogation. R96:5,14-15.
If defendant's brief is reasonably read to suggest that he is only challenging the
admission of his incriminating statement, his claim of ineffectiveness necessarily fails on
the ground that he has not, and cannot, establish prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
697 (holding that "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim" for lack of
prejudice, "[this] course should be followed"). This is because defendant's statement was
merely cumulative evidence supporting the paraphernalia charge. The State also
presented the marijuana pipe, a methamphetamine pipe, rolling papers, and plastic bindles
containing methamphetamine. See R96:51-52. Any one of these is sufficient to uphold
defendant's paraphernalia conviction. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004) ("It
is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to . .
. store, conceal, . . . inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human
body"). Defendant's incriminating statement was superfluous to the paraphernalia
charge; therefore, he cannot show a "reasonable probability that" if counsel had timely
filed a successful suppression motion, "the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
In any event, as will be shown in the body of this brief, any challenge to the
weapons frisk—or any of its fruits—would have been futile because it was eminently
justified by the trooper's observation of two large knives inside defendant's vehicle
during the traffic stop.
10

21-22 (1968)); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-716 (West 2004). "The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed;
the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord
State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986). The officer's reasonable belief must, of
course, be supported by "specific and articulable facts" as well as the "rational
inferences" that may be drawn from those facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. Police may "draw
upon their own experience and training to make determinations based on the cumulative
facts before them that may elude an untrained person." Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 14 (citing
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). An officer's subjective interpretation
of the facts, or subjective belief, "is one of several possible articulable facts a court may
consider as part of the totality of the circumstances." Id. at If 21. Finally, "[c]ourts must
view the articulable facts in their totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and
evaluate them in isolation from each other." Id. at ^[ 14 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274).
Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, including the inherent
dangerousness of traffic stops, the facts that Trooper Vasquez was working alone, and
that the stop occurred after 10:00 p.m. rather than in the light of day, and most
particularly, the fact that Trooper Vasquez observed two large knives—a switchblade and
a double-bladed combat knife—inside defendant's vehicle, the weapons frisk was
justified by reasonable safety concerns. See R96:43-44, 50-51, 58. Indeed, the

11

observation of knives within a driver's reach allows not only for a weapons frisk of the
driver's person, but a protective search of the area of his immediate control. Cf.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 & n.15 (1983) (upholding protective search
of Long's car, and by implication prior frisk of his person, incident to DUI investigation,
because it was late at night in a rural area and a hunting knife had been seen on the floor
of the car). Trooper Vasquez could have reasonably believed that defendant had other
weapons on his person or inside his vehicle, and was therefore justified in performing a
weapons frisk.
Indeed, the trooper's observation of the knives in this case alone distinguishes the
result in Warren, where the supreme court declined to uphold a weapons frisk, in part,
because the officer in that case testified that Warren "did nothing to cause [him] to be
alarmed and that he had no reason to believe that Warren was armed and dangerous."
2003 UT 36, ^ 32. Significantly, the officer in Warren observed no weapons upon
approaching Warren, or at any time during the traffic stop. Id. at ^[ 2-7. Thus, in
declining to uphold the weapons frisk in Warren, the supreme court recognized that "the
case was a difficult one," in part, because it "lack[ed] the kind of obvious articulable facts
that would make the determination easier. Id. at ^| 30, 33. Given the large switchblade
and double-bladed combat knives Trooper Vasquez saw inside defendant's vehicle, this
case, unlike Warren does not lack the obvious articulable facts that make the
determination easier. Id. at \ 3.

12

Notwithstanding the above, defendant maintains that trial counsel was ineffective
for not challenging the weapons frisk here at issue for essentially five overlapping
reasons: (1) Trooper Vasquez "had no historical contact with [defendant] to raise any
concerns that [defendant] might be a risk," (2) the trooper "had no information about
whether [defendant] had a criminal history," (3) "[defendant] also appear[ed] to have
been fully compliant throughout the encounter," (4) "[defendant] did not act aggressively
or make any furtive movement that was consistent with aggression or with retrieving a
weapon," and (5) knives are not presumptively dangerous weapons. Aplt. Br. at 6, 8.
According to defendant, trial counsel should have argued these points in the trial court
and because he did not, "Trooper Vaszquez was never adequately questioned about his
concerns for officer safety or cross-examined to determine whether those concerns were
reasonable under the circumstances." Aplt. Br. at 7.4
Defendant's assertions miss the point. As set forth above, it is well established
that the reasonableness of police conduct is judged against an objective standard. See
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). Under this
standard, the weapons frisk was justified so "long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justified [it]." See Devenpeckv. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (holding

4

Although defendant challenges the justification for the weapons frisk of his
person, he does not claim that any illegality occurred after Trooper Vasquez felt the "hard
metal object" that the trooper described as being "consistent with a metal pipe, . . .
commonly used to smoke marijuana," in defendant's right front pocket. R96:47-48. See
Aplt. Br. at 7-8.
13

that the officer's "state of mind . . . does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action"); accordBrigham City v. Stuart,
126 S.Ct 1943, 1948 (2006) (same); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)
(same); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that "it is of no
moment that [the officer] . . . did not himself suspect that respondent was armed"). An
officer's motive for acting is irrelevant. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding searches are
examined "without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers
involved"). Given the presence of the large switchblade and double-bladed combat
knives inside defendant's vehicle, the instant weapons frisk was objectively reasonable
regardless of whether defendant (1) had a criminal history, (2) was cooperative, and (3)
the knives could have possibly been put to legitimate, non-dangerous uses.5 See Warren,
2003 UT 36, Tf 14 (holding that reasonableness is determined by asking whether the facts

5

Defendant acknowledges that trial counsel adduced evidence through crossexamination of a law enforcement witness that the knives could have been used to cut
shingles and open boxes, Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing R96:69-70), but complains that this
evidence should have been presented though calling defense witnesses. Aplt. Br. at 9.
Regardless of whether the potential non-dangerous uses for defendant's large knives
came from law enforcement or defense witnesses, however, the knives themselves would
still be in evidence. R96:51. The trial court could reasonably base a finding of
dangerousness on its observation of the large knives alone. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 7610-50l(5)(a) (West 2004) (setting forth factors for determining whether an object is
dangerous including the character of the object, the character of any wound, the manner
in which the object was used, and other lawful purposes for the object's use); see also
State v. Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271, 273-74 (Utah App. 1995) (affirming trial court
determination that knife with four and one-half inch blade was a "dangerous weapon");
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 929 (Utah App. 1991) (affirming trial court
determination that two knives with "5 to 6 inch blades" were "dangerous weapons").
14

available at the time of the search would '""warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the action taken was appropriate'") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22)); see
also State v. Karsten, 2005 UT App 549 (unpublished) (upholding weapons frisk
conducted incident to traffic stop where officer observed two knifes in Karsten's vehicle
and suspected a third weapon may be hidden in one of Karsten's pockets). This would be
true, moreover, even if trial counsel had successfully elicited testimony from Trooper
Vasquez that he was not subjectively concerned for his safety after seeing the knives or
during the traffic stop. See Warren, 2003 UT 36, Tf 19 (holding that "an officer's lack of
subjective belief alone does not invalidate an otherwise objectively reasonable Terry
frisk"). Here, however, it happens that Trooper Vasquez was concerned for his safety
after discovering the knives. See R96:58 ("It appeared to be a knife. I wasn't for certain,
but it made me a little—being out on the road on the highway by yourself, you're a little
cautious to what's on the road. With it being a metal object, it appeared to be a knife, but
I couldn't say 100 percent sure it was a knife. I believed it to be some kind of a weapon
of sort").
Based on the above, it is clear that any challenge to the weapons frisk would have
had no chance of success. Because the weapons frisk was objectively justified, any
motion to suppress its fruits would have been futile and trial counsel cannot be faulted for
not filing a frivolous suppression motion. See, e.g., Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,
525 (Utah 1994) ("The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be
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futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance'") (quoting Codianna v. Morris,
660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. Messer, 2007 UT App 166,123, 578
Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (same).
C.

Defendant's claim that trial counsel failed to properly
investigate because he allegedly failed to examine a
videotape of the traffic stop is unsupported by record facts

Finally, defendant additionally asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he
allegedly failed to review a videotape of the traffic stop, a videotape defendant describes
as "perhaps not exculpatory." Aplt. Br. at 10. In support of his claim, defendant rehashes
his failed motion for remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See,
e.g., Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing "(R.55), Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey (in support of Rule 23B
Motion)5').6 See also Rule 23B Motion, Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey, and Rule 23B
Order (unsigned) (copies are attached in addendum A). Although unacknowledged by
defendant, this Court denied his rule 23B motion. See Order Denying Remand dated 22
March 2007 (a copy is attached in addendum B). This Court's ruling notwithstanding,
defendant does not hesitate to ask that the Court accept as substantive evidence, the very
extra-record allegations the Court has already rejected as mere speculation. See Order,

6

The Bailey affidavit was filed in support of defendant's Rule 23B Motion, a copy
of which is contained in addendum A. Although defendant represents that the affidavit
appears at page 55 of the record, it does not appear in the record on appeal. Rather, the
document numbered in the record at R55 is the "Judgment and Commitment to State
Prison." See id. Defendant likely intended to cite a page of the trial transcript: At
R96:55, Trooper Vasquez testifies that he reviewed the videotape of the traffic stop in
preparation for trial.
16

addendum B. Defendant's reliance on these extra-record allegations is improper and
should therefore be rejected. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998)
(granting State's motion to strike portions of Bredehoft's brief that relied upon his rule
23B affidavit on the ground that rule 23B affidavits are not substantive evidence of
ineffective assistance).
Because the Court denied defendant's rule 23B motion, the record on appeal
remains devoid of non-speculative evidence that trial counsel was ineffective for
allegedly not examining the videotape of the traffic stop. Absent any evidence that the
videotape was exculpatory, and that trial counsel did not examine it, this Court must
presume that trial counsel acted effectively. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17. "This
presumption is consistent with the fundamental policies" undergirding ineffective
assistance jurisprudence, that "'courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,'" id. (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), "and with the general rule that record inadequacies result in
an assumption of regularity on appeal." Id. (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,
1226 (Utah 1997)). Defendant's wholly speculative claim of ineffectiveness thus fails as
a matter of law. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's felony convictions for possession of dangerous weapons, drugs, and
paraphernalia should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _?_ June 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

IAN DECKI
Assistant Attorney General
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Don M. Torgerson # 10318
TORGERSON LAW OFFICES, P.C.

98 North 400 East
PO Box 955
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435) 637-1542

MT0RNEY6B IERM.
MARtt5 20B7 ^

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appelleet,
vs.

RULE 23B MOTION

RAYMOND CHARLES MARQUEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

Trial Ct. No: 0061700024

Appellate No: 20060737

[RELIEF SOUGHT]: Defendant/Appellant, Raymond Marquez, moves this
Court to remand this case in accordance with rule 23 B of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure for findings by the district court necessary to determine whether Defendant's
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
[GROUNDS:]
1. This motion is filed prior to filing Appellant's brief.
2. In pretrial discovery, Defendant's trial attorney submitted a formal discovery
request for copies of all relevant information that might be used in prosecuting the case.
See Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey at \ 3.

3. Before trial, the State failed to provide a copy of the videotape from the
Highway Patrol dash camera of the traffic stop giving rise to Defendant's charges. See
Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey.
4. The morning of trial, trial counsel was informed by the prosecutor that a
videotape existed but that it was not in the possession of the prosecutor and could not,
therefore, be provided or viewed prior to trial. See Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey at % 6.
5. Trial counsel and the prosecutor agreed to proceed with trial without viewing
the videotape but agreed to inform the judge, on the record, that the tape existed but had
not been provided prior to trial. See Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey at f 7.
6. During trial, trial counsel did not make a record of the nondisclosure of the tape
and the tape was not used by the prosecutor in presenting the State's case. See Affidavit
of Samuel S.Bailey at f 8.
7. Trial counsel has never viewed the tape to determine its usefulness to
Defendant's case. See Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey at \ 9.
[ARGUMENT]:
Because Defendant raises a claim that trial counsel was ineffective, he bears the
burden of assuring that the record is adequate. State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92, 98 (Utah
2000). Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows for temporary remand
to the trial court to introduce evidence that might help prove an ineffectiveness of counsel

claim and is directed at providing crucial factual information that is absent from the
record. State v. Johnston, 13 P.3d 175 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); UTAH R. APP. P. 23B.
Rule 23 B requires that Defendant allege nonspeculative facts, not fully appearing
in the record on appeal which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was
ineffective. UTAH R. APP. P. 23B(a) (West 2007). Further, the facts in the supporting
affidavits must show the prejudice claimed to be suffered by Defendant by the claimed
deficient performance of counsel. /Jat(b).
In this case, trial counsel has stated that he did not receive evidence from the
County Attorney that was clearly relevant to the case and still has not reviewed the
evidence. Because of the nature of the evidence— a videotape of the interaction between
Defendant and law enforcement— it is important to compare the videotape with the
testimony that was provided at trial. Additionally, the videotape may contain exculpatory
information that was important to the investigation and presentation of Defendants' case.
The videotape is important to determine if trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
complete a full investigation prior to trial and in failing to request a trial delay until he
had the opportunity to review the evidence with Defendant and determine its possible
usefulness to Defendant's case. Furthermore, appellate counsel needs to fully review and
make a record of the videotape in anticipation of an Anders-style brief.
The contents of that videotape and the facts set forth in the Affidavit of Samuel S.

Bailey do not appear in the available record and could support a determination that
counsel was ineffective.

WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this matter be remanded to the District
Court for hearing regarding the claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel relative to
the videotaped traffic stop in this case.

DATED this ^ d a y of February, 2007.

Don M. Torgprson
Attorney forT)efendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On February
2007,1 served the attached Rule 23B Motion on all interested parties
to this action as follows:
Utah Attorney General (1 Copy)
Appeals Division
160 East 300 South
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Court of Appeals (Original + 4 Copies)
P.O. Box 140230
450 South State
Salt Lake City Utah 84114
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By Hand
By First Class Mail
By Facsimile Transmission
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By Hand
By First Class Mail
By Facsimile Transmission

Don Torge#son

Q0PY
Don M. Torgerson # 10318
TORGERSON LAW OFFICES, P.C.

220 East 200 South
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435) 637-1542
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL S.
BAILEY
Appellate No: 20060737

RAYMOND CHARLES MARQUEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNT OF CARBON

Trial Ct. No: 0061700024

)
:ss
)

Samuel S. Bailey, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I was the trial attorney for Defendant, Raymond Charles Marquez, in this

2.

The matters stated in this affidavit are based upon my personal knowledge,

action.

would be admissible in evidence, and I am competent to testify to the matters stated
herein.
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3.

As Defendant's attorney, I requested discovery of relevant information from

the State on March 14, 2006, including videotapes and audio tapes that would be used in
the prosecution of the matter.
4.

On March 20, 2006,1 received copies of all police reports from the State.

5.

I did not receive any videotapes or audio tapes from the State relating to

this matter.
6.

On the morning of trial, I was advised by Gene Strate, the Prosecuting

Attorney, that a videotape of the traffic stop existed but had not been provided to the
County Attorney's office by the Utah Highway Patrol.
7.

Mr. Strate and I agreed that trial would proceed without the videotape but

that we would advise the Court that the tape existed and that I had not been provided a
copy of the tape in pretrial discovery.
8.

We did not make a record regarding the videotape and the videotape was

not used by Mr. Strate in prosecuting the matter.
9.

I have never viewed the videotape and I have not received a copy of the

videotape from the State.
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DATED this Z^day of February, 2007.

By:
Safnue-i-^r Bailey
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 3$~ day of February, 2007.

I
Notary Publi
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On February
2007,1 served the attached Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey on all
interested parties to this action as follows;

Utah Attorney General (1 Copy)
Appeals Division
160 East 300 South
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

By Hand
Xi_ By First Class Mail
By Facsimile Transmission

Court of Appeals (Original + 4 Copies)
P.O. Box 140230
450 South State
Salt Lake City Utah 84114

V

By Hand
By First Class Mail
By Facsimile Transmission

Don Torgerson
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Don M. Torgerson #10318
TORGERSON LAW OFFICES, P-C-

98 North 400 East
PO Box 955
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435) 637-1542
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appelleet,
vs.

RULE 23B ORDER

RAYMOND CHARLES MARQUEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

Trial Ct No: 0061700024

Appellate No: 20060737

This matter came before the Court in accordance with Defendant/Appellant's Rule
23B Motion. Defendant asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
trial counsel did not receive notice of a videotaped traffic stop until the morning of trial
and trial counsel proceeded to trial without reviewing the videotape.
IT IS ORDERED that this matter is remanded to the District Court to determine if
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance to Defendant at trial. On remand, the District
Court shall receive evidence and make factual findings within 90 days of this Order to
determine if trial counsel provided ineffective assistance to Defendant relative to the
nondisclosed videotape in this case.

DATED this

day of.

_, 2007.

By:
Appellate Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On February IK, 2007,1 served the attached Rule 23B Order on all interested parties to
this action as follows:
By Hand
_\£_ By First Class Mail
By Facsimile Transmission

Utah Attorney General (1 Copy)
Appeals Division
160 East 300 South
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Court of Appeals (Original + 4 Copies)
P.O. Box 140230
450 South State
Salt Lake City Utah 84114

By:

\p_
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Don Torgerso]

By Hand
By First Class Mail
By Facsimile Transmission
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S t a t e of U t a h ,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER DENYING REMAND
Case No. 20060737-CA

v.
Raymond Charles Marquez,
Defendant and Appellant

Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne.
This is before the court on a motion for remand under rule
23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A remand is
available only upon "a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not
fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could
support a determination that counsel was ineffective," including
facts that show "the claimed deficient performance" and "the
claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the
claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B (a), (b) .
Marquez has failed to show any prejudice from trial
counsel's failure to view the videotape. Marquez asserts that
the tape may have exculpatory value, but that assertion is merely
speculative. There is nothing indicating what, in fact, the tape
shows. It may support the officer's testimony of the encounter.
Absent facts that suggest prejudice, a remand is not warranted.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied.
Dated this <^3- day of March, 2007.

FOR THE COURT:

^^7U^

W i l l i a m A. T h o r n e J r . ,

Judge

fcU'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 22, 2007, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to:
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
KRIS C LEONARD
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
DON TORGERSON
TORGERSON LAW OFFICES PC
220 E 200 S
PRICE UT 84501
Dated this March 22, 2007.

Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20060737
District Court No. 061700024

